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Abstract 
I examine the dynamic evolutions of unemployment, hours of work and the service share 
since the war in the United States and Europe. The theoretical model brings together all 
three and emphasizes technological growth. Computations show that the very low 
unemployment in Europe in the 1960s was due to the high productivity growth associated 
with technological catch-up. Productivity also played a role in the dynamics of hours but 
a full explanation for the fast rise of service employment and the big fall in aggregate 
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   1 Introduction 
 
Three features characterize the dynamics of European labor markets in the post-war 
era. Unemployment has increased substantially, both absolutely and relative to US 
unemployment; overall hours of work have fallen, both absolutely and relative to US 
hours; hours of work in service employment have risen, but the service sector is still 
smaller than it is in the United States. 
One or more of these features are often cited as evidence that European labor 
markets have underperformed in the post-war era. Are these features interconnected 
and are they symptoms of under-performance? Answers to these questions require a 
model and this is the challenge that I take up in this paper. I develop a simple 
model that can be used to study simultaneously the three facts cited in my opening 
paragraph. Although the emphasis of my paper is on the  theoretical framework, I 
show with OECD data where the main differences between the major European 
countries and the United States are, and what is needed for a full empirical analysis. 
The dynamics of European unemployment have been studied extensively but there 
is no consensus about the causes of the large swings observed in the post-war era. 
Rigid institutions, high taxation and a generous welfare state in Europe seem to 
have played a part, but negative world-wide shocks also contributed to the rise in 
unemployment.1 I emphasize here a factor that although not entirely neglected in 
the recent literature, its full importance for unemployment has not been 
appreciated: productivity growth.  
Economists were aware of the role of productivity growth at a time when Americans 
looked at the European record with envy. Speaking in 1963, Robert Myers, then 
Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, claimed, “Unemployment 
has been a much less serious problem in the industrial countries of Europe in recent 
years than here, but the lessons we can learn from their experience - and put to 
practical application - are distinctly limited” (Myers 1964 p. 185). Ironically, it was 
thought that the European institutions that were blamed for the rise in 
unemployment twenty years later shielded European countries from macroeconomic 
shocks. They were unattainable in the United States because “of the American belief 





1For a sample of works on unemployment and the role of institutions see Bruno and Sachs (1985), 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Phelps (1994), Nickell (1997), Gordon (1997), Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) and Blanchard 
(2006). 
2This last quotation is not from Myers (1964) but from Downie (1964, p.161), who expressed similar 





1 and relative to US unemployment; overall hours of work have fallen, both
absolutely and relative to US hours; hours of work in service employment
have risen, but the service sector is still smaller than it is in the United
States.
O n eo rm o r eo ft h e s ef e a t u r e sa r eo f t e nc i t e da se v i d e n c et h a tE u r o p e a n
labor markets have underperformed in the post-war era. Are these features
interconnected and are they symptoms of under-performance? Answers to
these questions require a model and this is the challenge that I take up in this
paper. I develop a simple model that can be used to study simultaneously
the three facts cited in my opening paragraph. Although the emphasis of
my paper is on the theoretical framework, I show with OECD data where
the main diﬀerences between the major European countries and the United
States are, and what is needed for a full empirical analysis.
The dynamics of European unemployment have been studied extensively
but there is no consensus about the causes of the large swings observed in the
post-war era. Rigid institutions, high taxation and a generous welfare state
in Europe seem to have played a part, but negative world-wide shocks also
contributed to the rise in unemployment.1 I emphasize here a factor that
although not entirely neglected in the recent literature, its full importance
for unemployment has not been appreciated: productivity growth.
Economists were aware of the role of productivity growth at a time when
Americans looked at the European record with envy. Speaking in 1963,
Robert Myers, then Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, claimed, “Unemployment has been a much less serious problem in the
industrial countries of Europe in recent years than here, but the lessons we
can learn from their experience - and put to practical application - are dis-
tinctly limited” (Myers 1964 p. 185). Ironically, it was thought that the
European institutions that were blamed for the rise in unemployment twenty
years later shielded European countries from macroeconomic shocks. They
were unattainable in the United States because “of the American belief in
the desirability of market solutions”.2 But a main conclusion of both Myers
1For a sample of works on unemployment and the role of institutions see Bruno and
Sachs (1985), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Phelps (1994), Nickell (1997), Gordon
(1997), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell, Nunziata
and Ochel (2005) and Blanchard (2006).
2This last quotation is not from Myers (1964) but from Downie (1964, p.161), who
expressed similar views to those of Myers’, with some more comments into the political
economy of labor market policy.
2and Downie was that a key reason for the lower unemployment in Europe
was its faster economic growth, which was unattainable in the United States
because it was the result of a “gradual recovery from a devastating war and
the delayed attainment of industrial maturity” (Myers, 1964, p. 184). I will
show here that there is some credence to this view. One of the reasons that
we refer to a “European unemployment problem” is that we are comparing
an exceptional period, the period up to the early 1970s, with one that is
closer to a steady state, the 1990s.
The long-run dynamics of overall hours of work have been studied much
less than the dynamics of unemployment. The dynamics of structural change
and their interaction with unemployment and overall hours of work have been
studied even less in the recent literature. Two recent exceptions to this that
are closely related to the argument of this paper are Rogerson (2004, 2006)
and Freeman and Schettkat (2005). In both papers the authors emphasize
substitutions between home production and market work, as we do here.
Rogerson (2004) studied the role of technology and taxation in the evolution
of hours of work in postwar Europe and America, and found that although
technological catch-up can explain some of the diﬀerent experiences observed,
higher taxation in Europe also contributes to the explanation. Freeman and
Schettkat (2005) also looked at overall hours of work but also at hours in
sectors that have close substitutes in the home, such as restaurants and
child care. They found more home work being done in Europe, especially
by women, which can explain some of the cross-country diﬀerences in hours
of work.3 In this paper I will show how substitutions between home and
market production are inﬂuenced by unemployment and other factors. By
looking at the data I will be able to say something about the source of the
main diﬀerences in cross-country performance. But I will show that neither
productivity growth nor taxation can explain simultaneously the evolution
of European hours of work and the share of services.
A contribution of this paper is the development of a tractable model
with endogenous variables the rate of unemployment, overall hours of work
and the distribution of hours between diﬀerent sectors, in particular services
and other sectors. The exogenous variables are technology and policy. The
derivation of explicit analytical solutions depends on two key assumptions.
The ﬁrst is that there are two parallel markets, one for labor and the other for
3See Ngai and Pissarides (2005) for a dynamics model of hours allocations consistent
with the results of these papers.
3ﬁnal goods, that function virtually independently from each other. The ob-
jective of agents participating in the labor market is to maximize income, for
a given allocation of total working time (the participation rate). The equi-
librium outcomes from this market are total income and the allocation of
time to employment in diﬀerent sectors and to unemployment. In the goods
market a representative agent maximizes a utility function deﬁned over con-
sumption goods and leisure, subject to the per capita income generated in
the labor market. The equilibrium outcomes are the demand functions for
goods and the allocation of the time endowment to the home (leisure and
home production) and the market. So there is a two-way interaction between
the two markets, the labor market creating the income that constraints con-
sumption choices and the goods market giving the allocation of time that
constraints employment in the labor market. Given these constraints, each
market reaches equilibrium independently from the other.4
The second assumption is that each market reaches steady-state equi-
librium within a single ‘period’. The model is speciﬁed in continuous time
so ‘period’ refers to the transition from the model to the data. Partly be-
cause of data limitations, we can think of a year as the period. During the
year the labor market reaches the conventional steady-state equilibrium of
search theory, and the goods market is in an equilibrium derived from a static
maximization problem. There is no capital in the model so the only state
variables are the exogenous labor productivity parameters. For a given set of
parameters the goods market gives demand functions for consumption goods
and leisure, and the labor market gives total employment and unemploy-
ment. When in the following year the productivity parameters change, there
is a new set of demand functions and employment-unemployment decom-
position, also derived from a steady state with the new set of parameters.
This period-by-period progression describes the dynamics of the model in
real time.
The justiﬁcation for this assumption is that the search frictions are not
large enough to keep the economy oﬀ its steady-state path for long. Intu-
itively, being in the steady state of search theory is equivalent to being on
the Beveridge curve, as opposed to looping around it. The dynamics of un-
4This assumption is the adaptation to our environment of an assumption normally
used in business cycle models with search in the labor market. The usual justiﬁcation
is that there is insurance, either provided by a market not modeled or by large family
units, that allocates the total income created in the labor market equally across all market
participants (see Andolfatto 1996, Merz 1995 and Den Haan, Ramey and Watson 2000).
4employment in this case are driven by changes in the transition rates and
not by the internal dynamics of unemployment for given rates. I showed in
Pissarides (1986) that the evolution of British unemployment can be accu-
rately traced by the assumption that the labor market is on the Beveridge
curve at all times. I also showed that the transition rate that drives the
evolution is the one from unemployment to employment, with the transition
rate from employment to unemployment held constant. Similar conclusions
were reached by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2006) for the United States. The
assumption that the allocation of income to goods and leisure is obtained
from a static problem follows trivially from the assumption that the labor
market is in equilibrium and there is no capital in the model.
Section 2 describes the main relevant facts for the United States and the
main European economies. Section 3 discusses the assumptions made about
market structure and sections 4 and 5 respectively derive the labor-market
equilibrium conditions and the goods-market equilibrium conditions. Section
6 completes the description of equilibrium by bringing together the results of
the previous two sections. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the results of calibrations
with the model and section 9 introduces taxation and discusses both the
theory behind it and its quantitative implications.
2D a t a
I focus on six countries, the United States, the four big European countries
and Sweden. Any talk of Europe and underperformance has to include the
big three continental economies. I include Britain because up to about 1990
its labor market performance was very sim i l a rt ot h a to ft h et h r e ec o n t i n e n t a l
economies, but moved closer to the United States thereafter. Finally, I in-
clude Sweden because it is the biggest of the Scandinavian countries, which
followed a diﬀerent, more interventionist, model and apparently did a lot
better than the continental European countries. Another feature of Sweden
that is useful in my argument is that its economy was not destroyed by war,
and followed a diﬀerent convergence path. In the 1960s it was the richest
European country, by 2000 its per capita income was below that of the major
European economies.
A striking diﬀerence in the dynamics of US and European labor markets
is in hourly productivity. Figure 1 shows the trends in the six countries of
the sample. In 1950 European economies emerged destroyed after the war,
5with little and over-used capital stock and low labor productivity. There
followed a period of rapid growth and eventual convergence with the United
States, some 25-30 years later. The United States had the lowest productivity
growth rate in the post-war era, up to the mid 1980s. Britain was the other
country with low productivity growth. But by the late 1980s all countries
more or less converged.
I next show in three ﬁgures the smoothed series for the three variables
that are my focus here, unemployment, annual hours of work in terms of the
population of working age, and the annual hours of work in services in the
population of working age. Unemployment is deﬁned in the usual OECD
way, as a percentage of the labor force. The hours series is simply annual
hours of work divided by the population aged 15-64. For services I ﬁrst
constructed the employment share of services, in persons, which is the only
series available for all the countries. I then multiplied this by total annual
hours of work and divided by the population of working age.
Looking ﬁrst at the unemployment series, shown in ﬁgure 2, experience
is diverse. The striking feature of the overall picture since 1950, however,
is that the European countries have experienced bigger ﬂuctuations in their
unemployment series than did the United States. Viewed from a longer-run
perspective, the main diﬀerence between European and American unemploy-
ment is in the variance, not in the level. Whether this is a fact that will
persist remains to be seen, as more data come online. But if it is a fact it
is a puzzling one. The institutions that are supposed to have worsened Eu-
ropean outcomes are supposed to reduce the ﬂuctuations in unemployment,
not increase them. For example, employment protection and unions both
encourage labor hoarding in recessions.
European countries up to the early 1970s, with the exception of Italy, had
historically low unemployment rates of 2 percent or below. Following this era
unemployment went up everywhere, in the four big economies of Europe by
the same order of magnitude, in the United States by less and in Sweden with
a long delay. The delay in Sweden was caused by expansionary macro policy
and devaluations, which had to be abandoned when the country entered the
European Monetary Union (although not the single currency). The notable
exception in the more recent dynamics of European unemployment is the
fast decline in British unemployment, which has not yet been matched by
the other countries. But unemployment has been falling everywhere.
The dynamics of total hours of work are more in line with the traditional
consensus on the US-EU comparison (see ﬁgure 3). Whereas hours of work
6have fallen everywhere in Europe, the fall was biggest in the three continental
countries. The United States is an exception in this respect, in that hours
of work have risen. The rise was due to the rise in female participation,
a trend that started in Europe as well, but with a delay. So whereas the
United States had the lowest number of annual hours in 1960, by 2000 it far
exceeded all the other countries in the sample. And whereas Germany had
the largest number of hours of work in 1960, by 2000 it had, with France, the
lowest. The fall in hours of work in Europe is attributed mainly to the fall
in mean hours for the working population. Employment rates for younger
and older workers also fell but employment rates for women rose to partially
oﬀset them, in contrast to the United States which experienced a rapid rise
in overall employment - a feature sometimes referred to in Europe as the
“American employment miracle.”
The dynamics of service employment only partly reﬂect the dynamics of
overall hours (ﬁgure 4). The United States had more employment in services
throughout the period, and perhaps not surprisingly, given the dynamics
of overall hours, the gap widened during the sample period. France and
Germany had virtually identical experiences with service employment, with
Italy catching up with them in the latter part of the sample. Britain and
Sweden had very similar experiences with each other too. But interestingly,
the gap in hours of work in service employment between the United States
and the European economies is always bigger than the overall gap - which
indicates that the European economies put more hours into manufacturing
and agriculture than did the United States.
Two more types of data are useful in the analysis that follows. First,
how is non-working time allocated between home production and leisure, and
second, what relation is there between work time and unemployment? For the
ﬁrst, I use mainly time-use data reported in Freeman and Schettkat (2005) to
show a US-European comparison. They use time-use survey results for seven
European countries and the United States, including all the countries in our
sample except for France, to study time allocations in the age group 25-54
years. They concluded that the main reason for cross-country diﬀerences
in market work are diﬀerences in home production. See Table 1. Cross-
country diﬀerences in their sample are driven by female allocations, as the
men have very similar cross-country patterns.5 Further work on substitutions
5Italy is an outlier in men’s allocations, reporting very low home work time and corre-
spondingly high personal care and leisure time. This explains the diﬀerences in the results
7over time led the authors to conclude that there are signiﬁcant substitutions
between all the three uses of time - market work, home work and leisure.
But signiﬁcantly, for women the main substitutions are between home work
and market work. For men the substitution elasticities between market work
and each of the other two uses of time are about the same. Translated to
aggregate time patterns this ﬁnding is saying that the changes in market work
accounted for by women are matched mainly by changes in home production
time, whereas the changes accounted for by men are matched about equally
by changes in home work and in leisure.6
We conclude that the fall in European hours of work, which is mainly the
result of the fall in male hours, is reﬂected in a rise in both home production
time and leisure time. But the rise in female participation, which was stronger
in the United States than elsewhere, is reﬂected mainly in a fall in home
production time. For the United States in particular, where there are better
quality data on time use, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) concluded that there has
been a small rise in leisure since the 1960s, accounted for mainly by the fall
in home production time. Their results are consistent with the results of
Ramey and Francis (2005), who used a diﬀerent population base to conclude
that on average leisure time has remained more or less constant for much of
the 20th century, with a small rise in more recent decades. 7
A ﬁnal fact that I look at is the correlation between the participation rate
and the unemployment rate. I remove high frequency ﬂuctuations from the
data as over the business cycle such a correlation would be due to factors that
I do not examine here. Figure 5 shows the cross-section correlation between
the two series in 19 OECD countries. There is some, although not strong
negative correlation. Participation in the ﬁgure is measured by the number
of people either employed or unemployed in the population of working age. If
we convert to hours of participation instead, (constructed by dividing annual
hours of work by 1 − u, where u is the unemployment rate) the correlation
for men in the Table.
6The caveat should be expressed that the Freeman-Schettkat sample is restricted to
ages 25-54. Most of the fall in participation for both men and women, but mainly for
men, is accounted for by the age groups 15-24 and 55-65, so generalizations may not be
accurate.
7Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) claimed that the rise in female participa-
tion was driven by technological advances in the home, which freed women’s time. Ngai
and Pissarides (2005) also explain the rise in hours of work in the United States by technol-
ogy, but through a diﬀerent channel, improvements in the market-production technology
which outstripped the home-production technology.
8T a b l e1 :T i m eu s e ,p e r s o n sa g e d2 5 - 5 4 ,w e e k l yh o u r s
Market work Home work Total work Leisure Personal care
US 1992
Men 44.1 16.1 60.2 36.4 70.7
Women 28.7 30.1 58.8 35.0 71.2
Europe 1990s
Men 43.4 13.6 56.9 37.4 73.6
Women 20.7 40.5 61.2 32.1 74.6
Notes. Source: Freeman and Schettkat (2005), Table 3.
is less good.
3 Description of the economy
Production takes place in three separate sectors. Two of these sectors are
located in the market and production takes place after a match between
the ﬁrm and the worker. The third sector is located in the home and the
household allocates time to it to produce without involving a ﬁrm. The
main feature that distinguishes the market sectors from each other is that
the output of one is a better substitute for the home-produced good than
is the output of the other. I refer to the sector that produces the better
substitute as the service sector, and to the other sector as manufacturing.8
Production in all sectors takes place according to a constant returns pro-
duction function that employs only labor, so service output is AsNs and
manufacturing output AmNm, where Ai generally denotes technology and Ni
employment. Home-produced output is given by AhNh. T h er a t eo fg r o w t h
of Ai is denoted γi and the vector of Ai and γi (i = s,m,h) describes the
state of the economy. In the countries in our sample γm ≥ γs ≥ γh,b u tt h e
description of equilibrium does not require any quantitative restrictions on
the γi.
There are frictions when moving from the home to the market and when
changing jobs in the market, but these do not delay matching suﬃciently to
8Given the diﬃculties of distinguishing between good and poor substitutes for home
production in the data, in the quantitative analysis I match the good substitutes with the
entire service sector and the poor substitutes with the rest of the economy. This is not to
deny that there are services that do not have good substitutes in the home and there are
activities outside services that have good substitutes.
9cause substantial deviations of marginal products. I assume that sectorial
labor allocations ensure that the value of marginal product of labor in each
sector is common. I use some arbitrary weighted average of the prices of
t h et w om a r k e tg o o d sa sn u m e r a i r e ,a n dl e tpm and ps denote the prices of
manufacturing and service goods respectively, in terms of the numeraire. The
value of marginal product in manufacturing is pmAm and in services psAs, so
equality of marginal products implies , ps/pm = Am/As. Id e ﬁne A ≡ pmAm =
psAs and refer to it as labor productivity (or simply as productivity). In
equilibrium both workers and ﬁrms are indiﬀerent which sector they enter,
so we can model the allocation of time to employment and unemployment
in a representative sector with productivity parameter A and rate of growth
γ ≡ γm + ˙ pm/pm = γs + ˙ ps/ps. Both A and γ a r ei nt e r m so ft h en u m e r a i r e .
Decisions take place as follows. In the labor market there is a given allo-
cation of time L and a known A and γ, which describe its state. Workers and
ﬁrms maximize income over an inﬁnite horizon and the outcome is a division
of L between employment N and unemployment L − N, ap o s t - t a xw a g e
(1 − τ)w for each employed worker and a net transfer for each unemployed
worker b = ρ(1 − τ)w.H e r e τ and ρ (the replacement rate) are numbers
between zero and one and exogenous policy instruments. Taxes are used to
ﬁnance unemployment compensation and other government expenditure. In
the benchmark model I assume that the only expenditure is unemployment
compensation and the budget is balanced, and let τb denote the tax rate.
The total net income generated in the benchmark labor market by worker
decisions is wN, and is distributed between employed and unemployed work-
ers according to the compensation parameter b. Employment allocations are
then divided to satisfy Nm + Ns = N and the demand functions for goods
derived in the goods market.
In the goods market, a representative agent chooses consumption levels
for the three goods, ci (i = s,m,h), and home time 1 − L − Nh and Nh, to
maximize a utility function given w,b,pm,p s and the production function for
home services, ch = AhNh. This maximization gives the L that describes the
state in the labor market, and the consumption demands that determine the
allocation of employment to manufacturing and services.
104 Unemployment and wages
T h el a b o rm a r k e ti sm o d e l e da si nt h es i m p l e s tm o d e lw i t hg r o w t hi nP i s -
sarides (2000, chapter 3) with constant rate of job separation and match-
ing frictions derived from an aggregate matching function. The intensity
of search is constant, but I will argue later in this section that the intro-
duction of variable intensity enhances the impact of productivity growth on
employment.
The separation rate for existing jobs is denoted by λ and is a constant.
Let the matching function be
m =( su)
ηv
1−η,η ∈ (0,1) (1)
where s is a constant and u and v are respectively the unemployment and
vacancy rates. s could stand for the eﬃciency of matching or for the intensity
of each unemployed worker’s search, an issue which I discuss later on. I deﬁne
the transition rate of the typical unemployed worker by p = m/u = sηθ
1−η,
where θ is the tightness measure, θ ≡ v/u, and the transition of the typical
vacancy by q = m/v = sηθ
−η. The objective in this section is to derive an
equation for θ for a ﬁxed s and show that it gives a unique solution for
employment and wages conditional on L.
The equation for θ is derived from the choices made by ﬁrms. Let V
denote the value of a vacancy and J the value of an occupied job. The
Bellman equations giving their values are,
rV = −κA + q(J − V )+ ˙ V, (2)
rJ = A − w − λJ + ˙ J. (3)
The cost of holding a vacancy is a multiple κ of the product per worker. The
ﬁrm buys recruitment services from other ﬁrms that are already matched.
Although it is more plausible to assume that recruitment services are the
output of the service sector, it is analytically more convenient to assume
that each sector buys recruitment services from other ﬁrms in its sector. Our
results do not depend on this assumption.
T h ew a g er a t ei sa s s u m e dt ob eaw e i g h t e da v e r a g eo ft h eu n e m p l o y e d
worker’s income and the output per person:
w =( 1− β
0)b + β
0A, β
0 ∈ (0,1). (4)
11It is assumed that the wage rate is independent of outside labor market
conditions (in particular of the tightness θ) because quitting to become un-
employed is not a credible option in this environment (see for example Hall
and Milgrom 2005). Unemployment income enters because during wage nego-
tiations the worker is still unemployed and collecting compensation.9 Given
the deﬁnition of b, we can write gross wages as
w = βA β ≡
β
0
1 − ρ(1 − β
0)
. (5)
The job creation condition, which is used to derive the equilibrium equation







r + λ − γ
. (7)





(r + λ − γ). (8)
Higher γ requires higher θ, because with higher γ the eﬀective discount rate
by which future proﬁts are discounted is less. This is known as the “capital-
ization eﬀect” of faster growth.
Equation (8) gives tightness in terms of parameters. It is independent
of the level of productivity and of anything that is decided in goods mar-
k e t s .N o t et h a tu n e m p l o y m e n tc o m p e n s a t i o ni so n eo ft h ep a r a m e t e r st h a t
inﬂuence equilibrium tightness. The channel is the wage rate, because with
intensity ﬁxed, there are no search disincentives from higher compensation.
A higher replacement rate implies a higher wage rate for given labor pro-
ductivity, and so less job creation and lower θ. Note also that taxes do not
inﬂuence job creation, because of our assumptions that the wage set by the
ﬁrm and worker is the gross wage, workers pay all taxes and unemployment
compensation is taxed at the same rate as wages. But because workers pay
the taxes, they inﬂuence the supply of hours of work to the labor market.
9Some European countries also pay compensation to families during strikes, another
reason for making wages depend on unemployment income.
12To derive now the employment level and unemployment rate, note that



















r + λ − γ
¶1/η−1
.
The unemployment rate is fully determined by p and λ and so it is indepen-
dent of decisions made in the goods market.
The model so far has shown how total employment is determined, given
a participation rate L. The allocation of total employment between the two
sectors is determined by the equality of demand and supply for the two goods.
We postpone discussion of it until after we derive the demand functions. But
b e f o r eIm o v eo nt ot h eg o o d sm a r k e t ,Id i s c u s sh e r et h er o l eo fs e a r c h
intensity in the determination of unemployment.
Introducing variable intensity by workers increases the responsiveness of
search activity to shocks. To see this point consider (10). A change in one
of the parameters changes the term in the brackets and so causes a change
in p with elasticity 1/η − 1. But if s is endogenous, the parameter change is
likely to change s in the same direction as θ, because a shock that increases
θ is likely to increase the rewards of search to the worker. This introduces
another reason for a change in p. I do not derive here an optimal search
intensity but illustrate the likely outcome in ﬁgure 6.10
Equation (8), which gives the optimal θ fro each s, is a straight line
through the origin. In ﬁgure 6 it is labeled θ(s). Ar i s ei nγ rotates it anti-
clockwise, giving a higher θ for each s.T h eo p t i m a ls is also likely to depend
positively on θ, because higher θ makes search more rewarding to the worker.
A curve showing the relation between the optimal s and θ is drawn in ﬁgure
6 and labeled s(θ).A ni n c r e a s ei nγ increases the expected returns of search
10See Pissarides (2000, chapter 5) for the optimal derivation of search intensity in this
environment.
13because of a capitalization eﬀect and so rotates this curve clockwise and to
the right.
It is now easy to see the potential contribution of variable search intensity
to the impact of productivity growth on unemployment. When search inten-
sity is ﬁxed the s(θ) line in ﬁgure 6 is vertical. So the impact of a change in
γ is always less than what it is when the s(θ) line has positive slope. In addi-
tion, the s(θ) line shifts to the right when γ increases, further enhancing the
impact of γ on θ. Intuitively, a higher γ leads to more entry of vacancies and
so to more search intensity. This feeds back to vacancy entry. In addition,
search intensity increases autonomously in response to the higher γ, further
increasing vacancy entry.
Unemployment compensation and wage taxes are disincentives to job
search, because they reduce the net expected returns from taking a job.
So with endogenous search intensity, the tax-transfer policy that I assumed
in the benchmark model would lead to an anti-clockwise rotation of the s(θ)
line in ﬁgure 6 and to lower equilibrium θ. In addition, the fact that taxes
are used to ﬁnance unemployment compensation introduces another channel
through which the impact of productivity growth on unemployment becomes
stronger. With budget balance τ is not a parameter but depends on unem-
ployment. When there is a positive shock to γ unemployment falls, and so,
for given compensation level, taxation falls. This gives another incentive for
job search and further job creation. In ﬁgure 6, the impact of higher γ on θ
is enhanced by the fact that the fall in taxes that follows the rise in θ rotates
the s(θ) line further to the right.
The model with ﬁxed search intensity performs suﬃciently well for my
purposes and I will focus on that model. But since all taxes are likely to aﬀect
search intensity, a full modeling of the impact of taxation and unemployment
compensation on unemployment needs to take the choice of intensity into
account.
5C o n s u m p t i o n a n d l e i s u r e
Workers pool all their resources and allocate consumption on the basis of total
income available, irrespective of the labor market status of each worker. Two
g o o d sa r eb o u g h ti nt h em a r k e t ,m a n u f a c t u r i n gcm and services cs, so the
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s
pmcm + pscs = w(1 − τb)(1− u + ρu)L. (11)
14Employed workers generate income (1 − τb)w a n du n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r s(1 −
τb)ρw. The unemployment rate u is given by the labor market model and it
is independent of L. We denote in general the after-tax income generated for
each labor-market participant by y, so in this case
y ≡ w(1 − τb)(1− u + ρu). (12)
Note that when taxes are used only to ﬁnance unemployment compensation,
y = w(1 − u).
The utility function is given by

























Consumers derive utility from the consumption of the three goods and from
leisure time. We deduct all time spent in the market from leisure, although
the unemployed may have more time to spend as leisure than the employed.
The important assumption is that there is a time cost to unemployment; the
fact that all the time they spend as unemployed is a time cost is a convenient
simpliﬁcation. The nested CES function φ ensures that the elasticity of
substitution between service goods and home production is diﬀerent from
the elasticity of substitution between market goods. Normally ε<1 and
σ>1, so market goods and services are poor substitutes of each other but
home-produced goods are good substitutes for market-produced services (see
Ngai and Pissarides, 2005).
The utility function is maximized subject to the budget constraint (11)
and the production function for home goods
ch = AhNh. (16)





































and ph ≡ y/Ah is an implicit price for the home-produced good, the ratio
of the cost of devoting one hour to home production instead of market pro-
duction to the marginal product in home production. The implicit demand










Note that given ε<1, a rise in either market price reduces both market
demands, whereas a rise in income increases them both. But because σ>1, a
rise in the relative price of market-produced to home-produced goods, caused,
say, by a uniform rise in market prices or by a fall in ph, reduces X, and so
reduces the consumption of market services and increases the consumption
of manufacturing goods and home-produced goods.
The Appendix also shows that leisure is constant, a result that is a direct
consequence of our separable logarithmic utility function,11

















which together with (21) gives the allocation of time to market and home
work.
We now have all the ingredients for the derivation of overall equilibrium:
equations (17) and (18) give the demand functions used to derive the sectorial
labor allocations, and (21) and (22) give the allocation of time to the labor
market that determines overall employment and unemployment.
11This result mirrors the business cycle results of King, Plosser and Rebello (1988), who
derived restrictions on the utility function consistent with constant average leisure.
166 Labor allocation
With knowledge of L from the preceding section we can immediately obtain
total employment N =( 1− u)L from the labor-market model of section 4.
It remains to solve for Nm and Ns.
The production for market goods is AiNi, (i = m,s). Some of this is
used for vacancy advertising and the rest for consumption. In each sector i,
each ﬁlled position uses up in equilibrium (1 − β)piAi for vacancy advertis-
ing, a consequence of the zero proﬁt condition for job entry. With Ni ﬁlled
positions, the value of consumption of each good i is
pici = piAiNi − (1 − β)piAiNi
= βpiAiNi (23)




























which conﬁrms that Nm + Ns = N =( 1− u)L.
This completes the description of equilibrium. As before, equations (21)
and (22) give the allocation of time to home and market production. Equa-
tions (10), (26) and (27) give the allocation of market time to the three uses,
unemployment, production of manufacturing goods and production of service
goods. Finally, (17), (18) and (20) give the demand functions for the three
consumption goods.















17we can express it in terms of relative productivity levels, the fraction of output
claimed by workers and the rate of employment. Changes in employment and
employment shares over time are driven by changes in relative productivity
levels. This contrasts with the unemployment model, where changes in the
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eo v e rt i m ea r ed r i v e nb yc h a n g e si nt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho f
productivity. This result is important in the comparison of the performance
of the US and European economies.
An interesting and new feature of the model is that the participation
rate (L) depends on unemployment. Higher unemployment implies that for
an extra unit of time allocated to the market by the household will gener-
a t el e s si n c o m e-g i v e np r i c e sa n dw a g e s-a n ds om o r et i m ei sa l l o c a t e dt o
home production. In (28), this shows up as a higher implicit relative price of
market goods. Also, because ns/nm = X and X falls in ps/ph, conditional
on participation the share of services is lower relative to the share of manu-
facturing when unemployment is higher. In the traditional labor-economics
literature it was noted that empirically higher unemployment was associated
with lower participation, a correlation termed the “discouraged-worker ef-
fect”. The traditional explanation, however, refers to the business cycle and
it is that when there is unemployment, workers looking for a job become dis-
couraged and drop out of the labor market. Here the mechanism is diﬀerent
and could be a feature of steady states. Higher unemployment stands for
more market frictions and so households switch to more home production,
where there are no frictions. Because home-produced goods are closer substi-
tutes to services, the main market sector that suﬀers from this switch is the
service sector. Figure 5, which used sample means for a thirty-year period,
showed a weak correlation between unemployment and the participation rate
across the OECD, consistent with the ﬁnding reported here.
7 Quantitative implications: unemployment
We showed in ﬁgure 1 a falling rate of productivity growth for the European
countries and in ﬁgure 2 a rising unemployment rate. How much of the rise
in unemployment can be attributed to the falling growth rate?
In our model the key equation is (10). With endogenous search intensity
it is the equilibrium outcome shown in ﬁg u r e6 ,b u tIw i l ln o tp u r s u et h i s
extension here. The zero-proﬁt condition underlying (8) gives θ, which then
gives unemployment through (10). Higher rate of productivity growth in-
18creases θ and reduces unemployment. We showed in Pissarides and Vallanti
(2005) that in the simple benchmark model of this paper the only parameter
that really matters in the quantitative impact of productivity growth on θ
is the ﬁrm’s eﬀective discount rate, r + λ. If we interpret the model literally
and take λ to be the job destruction rate a reasonable number for it is 0.1
(Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996). But with this number and r equal to
4 or 5 percent, the calibrated impact of γ on θ is tiny and much less than
the impact estimated by econometricians.12 In Pissarides and Vallanti (2005)
we estimated that on average a unit rise in the rate of productivity growth
reduces unemployment by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. Such a big impact of
growth on unemployment can be rationalized by an equilibrium model like
ours only if the discount rate used by ﬁrms is small, in eﬀect if the horizon
over which ﬁrms discount the expected proﬁt from new job creation is much
longer than the expected job duration for the typical new job. I make this as-
sumption here to derive an impact of productivity growth on unemployment
that is close to the econometric estimates. As I argued previously, endoge-
nizing search intensity could increase the impact of productivity growth, and
the literature has identiﬁed some other mechanisms that enhance the impact,
related to relative physical and human wealth levels and to misperceptions
(respectively, Phelps, 1994, and Ball and Moﬃtt, 2002). I decided not to
pursue this line of research in the quantitative exercise to keep the model
simple. I take the shortcut of eﬀectively calibrating r+λ to the econometric
estimates of the impact of growth on unemployment.13
Equation (10) is very simple to calibrate. I set η =0 .5, in accordance
with econometric estimates (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) and so I get
p(θ)=
s(1 − β)/κ
r + λ − γ
, (29)
with s constant. In accordance with the argument in the preceding para-
graph, I set the discount rate r+λ =0 .055, except for Italy, where it is 0.08
because productivity growth rates in that country exceeded 0.07 in the early
1960s. This choice necessitates separation of the parameter for the inﬂow into
12Empirically, there is a strong link between productivity growth and unemployment.
See for example Phelps (1994), Fitoussi et al. (2000), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Ball
and Moﬃtt (2002) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2005).
13A mechanism that could rationalize the use of a longer horizon by ﬁrms than the job
destruction rate found in the empirical literature is that when the ﬁrm destroys a job in the
usual sense, it does not destroy the job position but “moth-balls” it for future activation.
19u n e m p l o y m e n ti n( 1 0 )a n dt h eλ parameter in the discount rate. I choose the
inﬂow into unemployment and composite of parameters in the numerator of
(29) to match the sample-mean unemployment rate and an average duration
of unemployment (= 1/p(θ)) of a quarter in the United States and approx-
imately two quarters in the European countries. The rate of productivity
growth in these initial calculations is set at its sample mean. I then use the
actual time series for the rate of productivity growth to generate a time series
for unemployment.
The results are shown in ﬁgure 7. The model does remarkably well match-
ing the actual data. Since we calibrated the ﬁrm’s discount rate to the econo-
metric estimates, a stronger test of the performance of the model than simply
comparing the two end points is its performance in tracking the dynamics of
unemployment. Here it does well. In France and Germany the entire rise in
unemployment is explained by the slowdown of productivity growth. In Italy
productivity growth also explains a large fraction of the unemployment rise.
In the early period unemployment is higher than predicted by the model, at
a time when the productivity growth rate was very high, but starting in the
early 1970s the model does a good job predicting the dynamics. The model
also tracks the unemployment dynamics in the United States, except that
it predicts a more delayed fall in unemployment in the 1990s than the one
observed. In Sweden and Britain the general trend predicted by the model is
also consistent with the data, but the model fails to track well the dynamics.
For Sweden this is not surprising, given that for most of this period the unem-
ployment rate was heavily manipulated by macroeconomic and labor-market
policy.
Interestingly, productivity growth is a better explanation of the dynamics
in the continental European countries, which are the ones that have suﬀered
most from institutional rigidities. It is unlikely that institutional rigidities
caused the fall in productivity growth in these countries, given the conver-
gence shown in ﬁg u r e1 . B u to u rr e s u l t ss h o wt h a ta tc o m p a r a b l er a t e so f
productivity growth, the continental European countries have some 3 per-
centage points of unemployment more than the Unites States. This is consis-
tent with the institutional approaches. It can be argued that the institutional
structure of the continental European countries is such that a productivity
slowdown has a bigger impact on unemployment there than elsewhere.14 Sec-
14Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, chapter 9), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Fitoussi
et al. (2000). The OECD Jobs Study (1994) also argued for a similar mechanism, although
20ond, it may just have happened that as productivity growth slowed down,
the continental economies increasingly made their institutions more rigid. In
contrast, Britain reformed in the opposite direction and the United States
took no action either before or after the slowdown.15
As an indirect test of the proposition that the impact of the productivity
slowdown on unemployment was inﬂuenced by the institutional structure of
the economy, I do the following.16 Recall that the inﬂow into unemploy-
ment and the composite of parameters in the numerator of (29) were chosen
to match the sample-mean unemployment rate and an average duration of
unemployment (= 1/p(θ)) of a quarter in the United States and approxi-
mately two quarters in the European countries. On the assumption that
the diﬀerence in duration is due to institutional rigidities, I re-calibrated the
continental European unemployment series by setting duration equal to one
quarter. The results are shown in ﬁgure 8. In France and Germany the
model explains only about half of the observed rise in unemployment. The
diﬀerence between the explained rise in these two countries and the one ex-
plained for the United States is due to the diﬀerences in the change in the
exogenous variable. It is clear that the assumption that the continental Eu-
ropean countries had persistently higher durations than the United States
contributes a lot to the explanation of the big impact of the productivity
slowdown on unemployment. In Italy the results are less striking - reﬂecting
partly the poorer performance of the model in that country. The explained
rise in unemployment in Italy when the initial duration of unemployment is
reduced to one quarter is of the same order of magnitude as the observed
rise.
Whichever institutional story is true, the conclusion remains that the
reason for the much lower European unemployment rates in the 1960s appears
to be the European economies’ faster rates of growth associated with catch-
up, as Myers (1964) and other early observers had anticipated.
not speciﬁcally with reference to productivity growth.
15Despite the apparent coincidences required for this argument to go through, it is not
implausible. See for example Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005), who argue that the
unemployment rise is due to institutional change.
16I am grateful to Richard Rogerson for suggesting this test.
218 Hours of work and structural change
The North Atlantic divide on hours of work and structural change is more
diﬃcult to replicate with the benchmark model than unemployment proved
to be. We begin by looking at the contribution of productivity growth to the
observed changes.
The key to the cross-country comparison of hours in the benchmark model
are the two relative-price variables. These drive the dynamics of X,t h er a t i o
of the employment share of services to manufacturing, and Nh/L, the ratio
of home work to market work. But there is a problem here. In Europe
the ratio of service to non-service employment has risen much faster than in
t h eU n i t e dS t a t e s ,a n dm a r k e th o u r sh a v ef a l l e nb ym u c hm o r et h a ni nt h e
United States. So if the model is to account for these diﬀerentials both X and
Nh/L in Europe have to rise much faster than in the United States. Because
technological progress in home production is not likely to have exceeded
technological progress in the market (see below for some data), the price ratio
ps/ph is likely to have fallen over time. A falling ps/ph can explain a falling
supply of hours to market services and to overall market work. Whereas the
latter is consistent with the data, if the model is to also explain the rise in
the relative share of services it needs a much faster growth in the relative
price of services, ps/pm, in Europe than in the United States. Available data,
however, show small diﬀerentials in the evolution of ps/pm between Europe
and the United States. Although the United States has had the smallest rise
in our sample, the diﬀerential between the United States and the countries in
our sample over the thirty year period is about 10 percent. The diﬀerences
in aggregate productivity growth associated with catch-up do not appear to
be reﬂected in diﬀerential rates of productivity growth across sectors.
Rogerson (2004), who was confronted with this problem, did not use
European productivity data. In order to replicate the structural pattern in
1956, his starting year, he assumed that European technology in 1956 was 38
years behind the United States (as aggregate hourly productivities indicate).
He then derived a manufacturing productivity in Europe that was only 40
percent of US productivity but a service productivity that was 62 percent
of US productivity. Available sectorial productivity data, however, do not
justify such big diﬀerentials, at least for the post-1970 period. If this were
the case, and the speed of catch-up in Europe was more or less proportional
to the gap, relative manufacturing-to-service productivity in Europe between
1970 and 2000 would have to rise by 30 percent over and above the US rise.
22But the observed ﬁgure is only about 10 percent.
Data for Europe on home production are not as comprehensive as for the
United States. I use US data from Ramey and Francis (2005) to derive a
relative-price series for market and home production. I choose σ =2and
ε =0 .317, make use of published employment data for ns/nm to compute a
time series for X and of the Ramey-Francis data to compute Nh/L. These
data and (19) and (22) give me a time series for (ψ/(1 − ψ))σ(ps/ph)σ−1.
Letting ps/ph ≡ 1 in 1970, I compute a value for ψ =0 .52 from the initial
values of the series for Nh/L and X. The derived implicit price ratio ps/ph
for this value of ψ for the United States is shown in ﬁgure 9. As expected,
the relative price of market services is falling, at an average rate of 1 percent
a year. From (28), if the share of labor β is constant, we also derive that
the productivity of market services has been rising at an average rate of 1
percent a year faster than the productivity of home production.
Now, if I use the computed series for ps/ph and assume that in 1970
ps/pm ≡ 1, Id e r i v ef r o m( 1 9 )ω =0 .024. With these parameters and the
computed time series for ps/ph, I use the ratio of actual data for hourly labor-
productivity growth in the service sector and in the rest of the economy to
derive a proxy for ps/pm and from these two get a prediction for the evolution
of relative employment shares. In the United States this prediction is almost
perfect, see ﬁgure 10(a). In order to show the predictive power of the model I
show in ﬁgure 10(a) the actual series for X ≡ ns/nm, the the predicted series
(which virtually coincides with it) and the series generated by holding ps/pm
constant. Clearly, the series ps/pm, which was not used in the computations
to this point, has a lot of predictive power.
In the absence of European data on home production, I use the relation
ps/ph = Ah/Asβ(1 − u) for the United States to derive a series for Ah/βAs
for the European countries. Using country data for 1 − u and assuming
that β is common, I derive a relative price series for each European country.
Because European unemployment has risen by more than US unemployment,
the computed price series for Europe falls less fast than the US series. But
the slower fall makes the prediction for the rise in the service share worse,
because slower fall in ps/ph implies a fall or slower rise in overall employment
that has its biggest impact on services. So although the joint treatment of
hours of work and unemployment contributes to the explanation of the faster
17See Rogerson (2005) and Ngai and Pissarides (2005) for the reasons for choosing these
numbers.
23decline of overall hours of work in Europe, it goes against the prediction of
a faster rise in the European service share.
As another check, I use available data on productivity growth in services
in Europe to adjust the relative price ps/ph, eﬀectively assuming that home
technology in Europe is the same as in America but service market technology
is as in the data. Doing this accelerates the fall in ps/ph in Europe, because
of the higher rate of service productivity growth associated with catch-up.
This improves substantially the model prediction for the rise in the relative
service share, but only at the expense of home production. By forcing a
bigger fall in relative prices we are implying that the market-production
technology has improved faster than the home-production technology, and
so more employment should move from the home to the market. So this
extension completely misses the fall in overall market hours. In some cases
it predicts that European hours of work should be rising.
This points to some other explanation, unrelated to technology, for the si-
multaneous rise of the relative service share in Europe and the decline of total
hours of work. European countries had a bigger agricultural sector in 1970
than the United States had, so the movement of labor from agriculture to ser-
vices may have contributed to the rise of the service sector. But this cannot
be an explanation for Britain, which had a comparable agricultural sector
to the United States (although in Britain the model predicts very accurately
the relative rise of the service sector). International trade is a more likely
explanation, as competition from Japan and other countries led to the shift
of employment out of manufacturing and into services or non-employment in
Europe. Barriers to market activity that are stronger in manufacturing are
also an explanation. One such barrier is trade union activity, which is more
prominent in manufacturing than in services.18 Finally, the fact that Europe
and the United States started from a very diﬀerent sectorial employment
distribution in 1970, with Europe having much lower service employment
relative to manufacturing and agriculture, has to play a role. When the dif-
ferences in the sectorial productivity growth rates are small it can take many
years for the sectorial employment distribution to reach a certain target. So
if the European economies are lagging the United States in this process, the
relative size of their service sectors should be increasing faster as they catch
18I argued in Pissarides (2006) that the decline of trade union power has played a
role in the fall in unemployment and rise in employment in Britain. Alesina, Glaeser,
Sacerdote (2005) also argued for the importance of trade union power in the determination
of European outcomes.
24up (Ngai and Pissarides, 2005).
9 The role of taxation
Another possible explanation for the diﬀerential performance of the United
States and Europe is taxation, an explanation that has attracted recent at-
tention in the literature.19 The issue of taxation and its eﬀect on labor
market outcomes is too big to be studied in detail here. The assumptions
made about the type of taxation - whether it is on income or on spending
- and the way the revenue is distributed by the government - whether as a
non-distortionary lump-sum transfer or as a distortionary subsidization of
some economic activity - are important determinants of the impact of tax-
ation on outcomes. In addition, in order to do full justice to the issue of
taxation we need a more complete theory of the incidence of taxation than
presented here. In our labor market model all taxes are paid by workers,
and so taxation does not distort job creation, except to the extent that it
inﬂuences workers’ search incentives.
The only taxes assumed so far in the model are the ones used to ﬁnance
unemployment compensation. We derived an important result that general-
izes to other taxes: if the tax revenue is returned to individuals conditional on
participation in the labor market taxes do not inﬂuence participation. But of
course, they may inﬂuence wages or hours of work by increasing unemploy-
ment. To some extent the higher unemployment in Europe at given produc-
tivity growth rates must be due to the more generous unemployment com-
pensation in Europe, although the estimated elasticities are small.20 Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel (2005) summarize the results of cross-country studies by
saying that a 10 percentage point rise in the replacement rate increases un-
employment by 1.1 percentage points. In OECD data the replacement rate
19See Nickell and Layard (1999) for a summary of earlier contributions, Daveri and
Tabellini (2000), Prescott (2002) and Rogerson (2004) for models that give a large role to
taxation in European countries, and Nickell (2004) for a recent summary of the econometric
evidence.
20Narandenathan, Nickell and Stern (1984) estimate on British data an elasticity of the
probability of leaving unemployment (our p) with respect to unemployment compensation
of −0.4. Meyer (1989) estimates on US data −0.9, but this elasticity depends on the level
of the replacement rate and his sample consisted of individuals with high replacement
rates. When adjusted for this his estimate is comparable to the British estimate. See also
the discussion in Nickell and Layard (1999) for cross-country evidence.
25in the United States is 15-20 percentage points less than in the continental
European countries, so this could potentially explain some 1.5-2 percentage
point unemployment diﬀerentials at common productivity growth rates. But
diﬀerences in replacement rates within Europe are not as big and yet there
are large unemployment diﬀerences. Finally, although unemployment com-
pensation can explain some unemployment diﬀerences, it cannot explain the
large diﬀerences in hours or work due to diﬀerences in participation rates.
Other taxes that do not have an impact on participation are taxes used
to ﬁnance “active labor market policies”. These are policies mainly designed
to get the unemployed back to work, or to provide subsidized training for
the employed. The Scandinavian countries are the biggest spenders on these
measures, but other European countries spend a lot on them too. Especially
those that have generous unemployment compensation, usually also have
generous active measures to oﬀset the impact of unemployment compensation
on unemployment.
With these caveats in mind, I now add to the model taxes that yield
revenue that is returned as an unconditional non-distortionary lump sum
transfer to households, denoted by τT, and taxes whose revenue is spent
on things that are not substitutes for goods in households’ utility functions,
denoted by τg.21 I continue to assume that all taxes are proportional taxes
on wages. The household’s budget constraint now is
pmcm + pscs = w(1 − τb − τT − τg)(1− u + ρu)L + T, (30)
where T is the lump-sum transfer. I denote τb + τT + τg ≡ τ, so now
y = w(1 − τ)(1 − u + ρu),
which by budget balance is equal to w(1 − τT − τg)(1 − u). In light of our
earlier discussion, the tax τb should now include all taxes that are used to
raise revenue spent on labor market measures. I assume for simplicity that
the tax instruments τT and τg are exogenous, and the budget is balanced
through changes in the spending that is not in utility functions or in T.
Taxes now have an impact on the allocation of time and the demand for
goods. The derivations in the Appendix are unaltered by the introduction of
21If the government spent the tax revenue on goods that are perfect substitutes to
privately-purchased goods, such as health care, the impact of taxes would be the same as
the one of a lump-sum transfer.
26taxes up to (46), which now becomes,
1=λy(L + Nh)+λT. (31)
Combining with (41) we get a new condition for the supply of work time,




By budget balance T = τTw(1 − u), so (32) becomes






1 − τg − τT
¶
. (33)
If T = τT =0 , i.e., no tax is returned as a lump-sum transfer, leisure is
still constant and independent of taxation. The disincentives of taxes on the
supply of labor are due entirely to the component of the tax that is trans-
ferred, τT. Prescott (2002) and Rogerson (2004) derived large disincentive
eﬀects of taxes partly because they assumed that all taxes are returned as
lump-sum transfers, i.e., in their models τT = τ. Income and substitution
eﬀects for taxes not returned oﬀset each other because of the logarithmic
utility function. But if τT > 0, other taxes also cause disincentives, and if
τg > 0, the disincentives of marginal changes in transfers are bigger.
Reasoning as before for the demand for goods we obtain,
cm =











so not surprisingly, only the “wasteful” component of taxation reduces con-
sumption demands, because it reduces the income of individuals. The relative
allocation of demand to home consumption and market consumption in (20)
remains unaltered for given prices, but relative prices are distorted by taxa-
tion. Whereas the relative prices of market goods are the same as before, the
implicit price of home-produced goods falls, since by deﬁnition ph = y/Ah





β(1 − τg − τT)(1 − u)As
. (36)
27The introduction of taxes therefore increases the relative price of market
goods and reduces X. This change works against the requirement that the
relative service share should increase. Intuitively, taxes make home produc-
tion more attractive and this aﬀects adversely service employment by more
than non-service employment, because of the better substitution possibilities
between home production and market services.
Taxation may, however, help explain the fall in market hours. The equa-















This equation and (33) are solved for the allocation of time with taxation.
Taxes increase leisure and home production, so the impact on market work is
l i k e l yt ob es u b s t a n t i a l .W en o t et h a tt h eb i g g e rt h ef r a c t i o no ft a x e sr e t u r n e d
as lump sum, the bigger the relative impact on leisure and the smaller the
relative impact on home production.
In the absence of readily-available information on the fraction of tax rev-
enue spent on diﬀerent measures, ﬁgure 11 reports the results of running
the model with taxes, by following Prescott (2002) and Rogerson (2004) and
assuming that all taxes are returned as an unconditional lump-sum transfer.
Given our discussion of labor market policies, this assumption is clearly in-
appropriate for all countries, but especially for Sweden. Results are mixed.
First, we note that under this assumption the supply of market hours is very
sensitive to taxation. Econometric studies did not ﬁnd such a big impact
of taxation on employment, which is evidence against this type of modeling
for taxes. In the case of Sweden the model breaks down. Taxes increased so
much between 1970 and 1985 that the prediction is that hours of work should
drop to negative numbers. In the case of Italy taxes fail to get the dynamics
of hours but they predict the 2000 level fairly accurately. This result points
to the risks of evaluating the impact of taxation by comparing single points.
But taxes improve substantially the prediction of market hours for France
and Germany.
10 Concluding remarks
What can we make of our theoretical and quantitative results? First, about
the theory: bringing together the model of unemployment on the one hand,
28and hours of work on the other, has some advantages but not enough to make
individual studies of each question in isolation obsolete. The overall partic-
ipation rate can be taken as exogenous in the unemployment model, and
unemployment can be included as a variable that summarizes labor-market
frictions in the participation model. But apart from these connections, the
models can be solved independently from each other. The important produc-
tivity and taxation variables inﬂuence the outcome of each model diﬀerently.
Unemployment is inﬂuenced by the rate of growth of productivity, but the
supply of hours is inﬂuenced by productivity in services relative to other mar-
ket sectors and to home production. Home production plays an important
role in the responsiveness of hours of work to exogenous shocks, although
when there is distortionary taxation there are substitutions between hours
of work and both leisure and home production. Taxation overall has less
impact on unemployment than on participation, but taxation that is used
to ﬁnance spending that is conditional on labor-market participation, such
as unemployment compensation or active labor market measures, inﬂuences
unemployment but not the supply of hours of work to the labor market.
In the quantitative analysis I showed that the main reason for the reversal
in the unemployment fortunes of Europe and North America is in productiv-
ity growth. In the post-war era and up to the 1970s productivity growth in
most European countries was fast because of technological catch-up. This ex-
plains why unemployment was low. But some role for institutions remains, in
that when productivity growth rates converged, equilibrium unemployment
in some European countries, especially in the three big continental countries,
settled at some 2-3 percentage points above US unemployment.
The model is less successful at explaining the reasons for the very dif-
ferent behavior of hours of work and sector employment shares in Europe
and America. Sectoral diﬀerentials in productivity growth explain well the
US employment distribution. But if similar assumptions are made about
preferences and institutions in Europe, the predicted diﬀerences due to pro-
ductivity diﬀerentials are too small compared with the observed diﬀerences
in the dynamics of the service share. Accounting for institutional diﬀerences
is one way forward. The results of introducing taxation in the model are
mixed, because of the diﬃculty of distinguishing diﬀerent types of taxes in
the data. But higher taxes in Europe must have contributed to the fall in
hours. Another factor that may be important is the diﬀerence in the initial
employment distribution in each case. But for this to matter in a model there
must be either diﬀerences in the relative productivity growth rates associated
29with the initial distribution or some other slow changing state variable, like
capital. We showed that diﬀerences in the relative productivity growth rates
are not suﬃciently big to account for his, so further analysis of this issue
requires a model with a slow-changing state variable, like physical capital or
barriers to economic activity that slow down labor mobility.
11 Appendix
11.1 Derivation of optimal consumption and time al-
locations
Let φi denote the partial derivative of φ with respect to ci (i = m,s,h), λ be
the Lagrangian multiplier for (11) and µ the multiplier for (16). Then the











1 − L − Nh
= λy (41)
α
1 − L − Nh
= µAh. (42)





























30Making use of the two constraints, (11) and (16), we obtain,
1=λy(L + Nh). (46)
Combining (46) and (41) we get (21).

































from (38) and (39) we get,
ω



















where X is deﬁned in (19). By solving now (50) and the budget constraint
(11) for the two unknowns cm and cs we get the demand functions for the
two market goods in (17) and (18). From (47) we obtain the implicit demand
function in (20).
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Unemployment rate vs participation rate, 1970-98 















































The impact of higher productivity growth on labor market equilibrium 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































predicted, constant relative pricesFigure 11
Predicted and actual service/nonservice employment Predicted and actual share of market time
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GDP in international PPP dollars divided by hours of work. 
Sources: Penn World Tables and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (see 




ILO/OECD unemployment rate. EU3 is the average for France, Germany and Italy 
Source: Angus Maddison Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, Oxford: 








Proportion of employees in the service sector multiplied by total annual hours of work 
divided by population of working age 





OECD unemployment rate versus labor force (employed and unemployed) divided by 
population of working age 
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook 
 
Figures 7 and 8 
 
All data used in the unemployment prediction have already been defined in preceding 
graphs 
 
Figures 9 and 10 
 
Data used in the construction: Total market hours and service hours as before. Total 
hours of home production from Ramey and Francis (2005). Sectoral output obtained 
from STAN Database for Industrial Analysis by aggregating individual sectors after 
converting in international PPP dollars. Sectoral productivity is sectoral output 




Taxes obtained from CEP/OECD data set and defined as the total “tax wedge”, which 
is the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax rate and the indirect tax rate 
(source: Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel 2005).  CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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